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II. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
In this case, the original plaintiff, Anna Lee Anderson is 
the beneficiary of the Norman Anderson Trust. Her son, James 
Anderson was the trustee of the trust. In direct violation of the 
terms of the trust, James transferred the bulk of the trust assets 
(stocks) to his own personal account which was managed by 
Defendants Ralph Pahnke and Dean Witter Reynolds. Pahnke was the 
account executive for not only James1 personal account, but also 
for the trust's account. Both Pahnke and Dean Witter had been 
provided copies of the Norman Anderson Trust and were familiar with 
the limitations and conditions therein. In spite of their 
knowledge of the impropriety of the transfer of stock from the 
Norman Anderson Trust account into James1 personal account, Pahnke 
and Dean Witter authorized the transfer and participated in the 
same receiving commissions therefrom. 
Anna Lee was unaware of this transfer and that it was in 
violation of the Norman Anderson Trust. Immediately upon learning 
of the violation, Anna Lee filed this action against defendants in 
December, 1990. Anna Lee the proper party plaintiff because the 
trustee, her son, had neglected to bring such an action. It is 
clear that a beneficiary may bring an action against a third party 
who participates in a breach of trust by the trustee. Even if the 
Court were to find that Anna Lee was no longer a party after the 
filing of the Amended Complaint, she would still have standing to 
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appeal because she is the real party in interest. Further, there 
is no more appropriate Appellant to file this appeal. Anna Lee was 
privy to the action and was aggrieved by the Court's ruling. 
A review of the Record and transcripts of the hearing on 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint reveals that 
Anna Lee has claimed from the beginning that the trustee, her son, 
breached his fiduciary duty to the trust. 
III. 
ARGUMENT 
I. ANNA LEE IS A PARTY TO THE ORIGINAL ACTION AND MAY APPEAL 
THE DISMISSAL OF HER ORIGINAL COMPLAINT. 
A. A Final Order or Judgment is Appealable. 
Anna Lee's original Complaint was formally dismissed by a 
signed final Order. See, Rec. 214 - 215. Under Utah law, an 
appeal can only be taken from a final order or judgment that has 
been signed by the Court. Salt Lake City Corp. v. Layton, 600 P.2d 
538, 539 (Utah 1979). 
In the present case, Anna Lee's original Complaint was 
formally dismissed by a signed written order dated September 16, 
1991. The order was a final order concluding Anna Lee's action 
against Defendants. Therefore, having appealed from a final order 
of the Court, Anna Lee is properly before this Court as an 
appellant and may appeal the dismissal of her Complaint. 
Defendants contend that Anna Lee is no longer a party to this 
action and therefore lacks standing to appeal the dismissal of her 
Complaint. However, the case law Defendants rely upon to support 
their contention is distinguishable and inapplicable to the facts 
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of the instant case. Defendants rely upon Teamsters et al v. Motor 
Cargo, 530 P.2d 807 (Utah 1974) and DiPasouale Construction Corp. 
v. Zinnert, 539 A. 2d 618 (Conn.App. 1988) to support the propostion 
that Anna Lee is prohibited from filing an appeal in this matter. 
In Teamsters, the Utah Supreme Court held that the provisions 
of a collective bargaining agreement ("Agreement") between a union 
and its employers could not be considered absent the introduction 
of the Agreement into evidence or attachment of or reference to the 
Agreement in the Complaint. 530 P. 2d at 809. The Agreement had 
been attached to the original Complaint. However, the Complaint 
was subsequently amended. Plaintiffs failed to attach the 
Agreement to the Amended Complaint or make reference to the 
Agreement or the original Complaint. Nevertheless, the trial court 
considered the Agreement in deciding the case even though it had 
not been admitted into evidence. 
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Utah held that the Agreement 
was not properly before the trial court because it was not 
introduced into evidence or appended to the Amended Complaint. 
Further, the Court held that "since the original Complaint has no 
function [in the present action due to the fact that it has been 
amended], there was no evidence [of the Agreement] in the record 
which would enable the [trial] court to rule as it did." Id., at 
809. 
Teamsters,however, clearly does not apply to the present 
case. The Court in Teamsters did not dismiss the original 
Complaint and the issue was not whether the appeal was properly 
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before the Court as in the present case, but rather, whether the 
trial Court erred in considering the agreement which was not in 
evidence. The Teamsters holding is limited to the proposition that 
evidentiary information contained in the original Complaint, but 
left out of the Amended Complaint and not introduced into evidence, 
cannot be the basis of the Court's decision. This proposition has 
no application to the present action. 
In the present case, Anna Lee is not attempting to bring 
evidence contained in her original Complaint before the Court as a 
basis for the Court's determination of the Amended Complaint. Both 
Complaints were formally dismissed by the Court by signed written 
orders. Anna lee now seeks only to appeal the formal dismissal of 
her action pursuant to those orders. 
In DiPasguale, Defendants filed an Answer and a two count 
Counterclaim. The trial court struck one count of the Counterclaim 
and subsequently granted Plaintiff's Motion for Default and nonsuit 
brought pursuant to the Connecticut Rule of Practice because 
Defendants failed to plead over after the Motion to Strike was 
granted. The Appellate Court of Connecticut held that a party is 
not required to "file a substitute pleading when less than the 
entire pleading has been stricken." DiPasguale at 619. The 
Connecticut Appellate Court further stated that when a Motion to 
Strike an entire pleading is granted by the Court, the losing party 
"may amend his pleadings, or he may stand on his original 
pleadings, allow judgment to be rendered and appeal." Further, the 
DiPasguale court stated that the filing of an amended pleading is 
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a withdrawal of the original. The ruling in DiPascpiale is clearly 
limited to the facts of that case and the peculiarities of the 
Connecticut Rules of Practice. 
In the present case, Defendants contend that because Anna Lee 
filed an Amended Complaint in an effort to resurrect her case, she 
is now somehow precluded from appealing the dismissal of her 
original Complaint. However, Defendants have overlooked the fact 
that the trial court in the present action executed a formal signed 
written order dismissing Anna Lee's original Complaint. The order 
dismissing Anna Lee's original Complaint was not even executed by 
the Court until after she had filed her Amended Complaint, the 
Defendants had filed their Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint, 
and the Court had heard oral argument and already granted 
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint. Obviously, 
filing of the Amended Complaint did not prevent the Court from 
formally dismissing Anna Lee's original Complaint after the fact. 
If the trial Court recognized the Amended Complaint as a withdrawal 
of the original Complaint, execution of the order dated September 
16, 1992 would have been superfluous. It is clear, therefore, that 
neither Teamsters nor DiPascpiale are applicable in the present 
action. 
For the reasons stated above, the case law Defendants have 
relied upon to support their contention that Anna Lee may not 
appeal the dismissal of her Complaint is not applicable to the case 
at hand. Anna Lee has every right as Plaintiff in the original 
action to appeal the dismissal of her action and requests this 
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Court to recognize her right to do so and allow her to proceed with 
her appeal in this matter. 
B. Even If Anna Lee Lost Her Standing As A Party By Amending 
Her Complaint, She Is The Real Party In Interest And As Such 
Is Entitled To Appeal The Dismissal of Her Complaints. 
The Supreme Court of Utah has stated that the traditional 
test for standing in the district courts is twofold: (1) the 
interest of the parties must be adverse; and (2) the parties 
seeking relief must have a legally protectible interest in the 
controversy. Jenkins v. Swanf 675 P.2d 1145, 1148 (Utah 1983). In 
the present case, Anna Lee meets both of these requirements. There 
can be no serious question that Anna Lee's interests are adverse to 
those of Defendants. Further, it is clear that Anna Lee's interest 
in the controversy is legally protectible. As such, Anna Lee has 
the right to appeal final adverse rulings of the district court and 
is therefore a proper party to this appeal. 
Even if Anna Lee failed the above-stated standing 
requirements, she would still be the proper party to bring this 
appeal. The Supreme Court of Utah has determined that an 
individual who does not meet the traditional test of standing may 
be granted standing if "there is no more appropriate appellant and 
the issue is unlikely to be raised at all if the [appellant] is 
denied standing." Kennecott Corp. v. Salt Lake County, 702 P.2d 
451, 454 (Utah 1985); See, also, Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 1145, 
1150-51 (Utah 1983). 
In the present case, Anna Lee is the most appropriate party 
to bring this appeal. She, alone, was the party whose Complaint 
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was dismissed at the outset of this case. Anna Lee, as beneficiary 
of the Norman Anderson Trust, has been financially injured by 
Defendants1 actions. The former trustee is not an appropriate 
party to appeal this action because he breached his fiduciary duty 
to Anna Lee and is partly responsible for her financial injuries. 
Defendants contend that David M. Dudley, the Substitute 
Trustee, is the only proper party to bring this appeal. When Anna 
Lee's original Complaint was dismissed, Anna Lee caused David M. 
Dudley to file the Amended Complaint as the Substitute Trustee of 
the Norman Anderson Trust. There is no question that David M. 
Dudley represented the interests of Anna Lee. The Court was aware 
of this fact. Defendants were aware of this fact. It is 
interesting to note that the order drafted by Defendants and 
executed by the Court dismissing the Amended Complaint was styled 
"Anna Lee Anderson, Plaintiff vs. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., . . 
. ". See, Rec. 218 - 19. Naturally, the Amended Complaint itself 
was styled "David M. Dudley, Trustee of the Norman Anderson Trust, 
Plaintiff, . . ." See, Rec. 92. Perhaps this was just a 
"Freudian" slip on the part of Defendants, but it is also 
indicative that everyone knew and recognized that Anna Lee was the 
real party in interest. 
Anna Lee is the proper party to appeal the dismissal of her 
action. She is the one person who has suffered harm from the 
actions of the Defendants and has a stake in the outcome of this 
case. Finally, and perhaps most compelling, the issues at hand 
will not be raised and redressed at all if Anna Lee is denied 
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standing• 
1. Non-parties may bring an appeal in certain situations. 
Defendantsf contention that a non-party to an action cannot 
bring an appeal is not completely accurate. According to Utah law, 
once an appellant has shown that he or she meets the traditional 
standing requirements, an appellant "must show that he or she was 
a party or privy to the action below and that he or she is 
aggrieved by the Court's judgment." Society of Professional 
Journalists v. Bullock, 743 P. 2d 1166 (Utah 1987) (emphasis added) 
citing Olson v. Salt Lake City School District, 724 P.2d 960, 962 
(Utah 1986) . As previously set out, Anna Lee meets the traditional 
standing requirements having suffered "some distinct and palpable 
injury that gives [her] a personal stake in the outcome of the 
legal dispute." Bullock, 743 P.2d at 1170 quoting Jenkins v. 
Swan, 675 P.2d 1145, 1148 (Utah 1983). Assuming, arguendo, that 
this Court finds that after the filing of the Amended Complaint 
that Anna Lee was not a party to the action below, it should also 
certainly find that Anna Lee was a privy to said action. As used 
in determining whether an individual is a proper party to appeal an 
action, privy means "heirs, executors, administrators, terre-
tenants and those having an interest in remainder or reversion, or 
persons who are made parties by law." 4 Am. Jur. 2d Appeal And 
Error § 176 (1962)(emphasis added). Pursuant to Bullock and Olson, 
Anna Lee did not have to be a party to the action in the trial 
Court in order to bring an appeal so long as she was a privy to the 
action and aggrieved by the Court's ruling. In light of the 
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foregoing, there is no question that Anna Lee was a privy to the 
action and was certainly aggrieved by the Court's rulings. 
Neighboring state Courts have also found that a non-party has 
standing to appeal "if it appears that the appellant was 
'substantially aggrieved by the disposition of the case in the 
lower court.'" Roberts-Henry v. Richter, 802 P.2d 1159 (Colo.App. 
1990) citing Miller v. Clark, 144 Colo. 431, 356 P.2d 965 (1960). 
Similarly, the Supreme Court of Montana stated that the test to 
determine standing to appeal is "whether one has a direct, 
immediate and substantial interest in the subject which would be 
prejudiced by the judgment or benefitted by its reversal. A non-
party has standing to appeal if he has such an interest." Montana 
Power Co. v. Dept. of Public Serv. Reg., 709 P.2d 995, 1001 (Mont. 
1985) citing Estate of Tomlinson, 65 111.2d 382, 359 N.E.2d 109, 
111 (1976). 
There is absolutely no question that Anna Lee meets the 
criteria cited in the cases above. Anna Lee has a direct immediate 
and substantial interest in this action becuse she, as beneficary, 
was harmed by Defendants' unlawful transfer of assets from the 
Trust. Further, Anna Lee will undoubtedly be prejudiced by the 
order dismissing her Complaints in that the dismissals will deprive 
her of obtaining relief from the injuries she has suffered. On the 
other hand, Anna Lee will be greatly benefitted by this Court's 
reversal of the dismissals because such reversal will allow her to 
pursue the only remedy she has against Defendants. Therefore, 
under Utah law and the law of surrounding jurisdictions, Anna Lee 
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may bring this appeal, even if this Court finds that she lost her 
status as a party when she amended her Complaint. 
II. ANNA LEE'S COMPLAINT COMES WITHIN AN EXCEPTION TO THE 
GENERAL RULE THAT ONLY THE TRUSTEE CAN BRING THE 
PRESENT ACTION. 
A. Anna Lee Pled, With Specificity, An Exception To The 
General Rule That Only A Trustee May Sue On 
Behalf Of The Trust. 
Anna Lee pled that Defendants knowlingly participated in the 
breach of fiduciary duty when they induced and obtained the 
transfer of assets from the Trust account to the personal accounts 
of the Trustee and the Anna Lee Anderson Trust. She further pled 
that said transfer was in violation of the Trust Agreement. In her 
opening brief, Anna Lee has lead this Court through the facts and 
law clearly showing that she fits within an exception to the 
general rule requiring suits to be filed by trustees and not by the 
beneficiaries to a trust. 
B. The Trustee's Breach Was Not Raised For The 
First Time On Appeal. 
Defendants1 contention that Anna Lee mentioned the trustee's 
breach for the first time on appeal is inaccurate. Anna Lee 
discussed the trustee's breach in her Reply Memorandum in Support 
of Plaintiff's Motion to Amend Complaint, Rec. 160 - 167; 
Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to 
Dismiss, Rec. 52 - 64; and during oral argument of Defendants' 
Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint before Judge 
Frederick, Rec. 235 - 243. Throughout the above-mentioned 
pleadings, Anna lee referred to the transfer of assets as a breach 
of fiduciary duty and in direct violation of the Trust Agreement. 
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Anna Lee refers specifically to the Trustee's participation in said 
breach. Anna Lee states in these pleadings that the Trustee signed 
the letter of instruction, prepared by Defendants, authorizing the 
transfer of assets from the Trust. She also states that such 
transfer was in direct violation of the trust provisions. 
It is true, however, that Anna Lee does not contend that the 
Trustee knowingly breached his fiduciary duty. In fact, she claims 
that the trustee was unaware of his breach. However, the trustee 
need not knowingly breach his fiduciary duty in order for this 
action to come under the exception allowing an individual to bring 
suit on her own behalf as a beneficiary of the trust. 
In any event, it is clear that the issue of the trustee's 
breach of his fiduciary duty were brought to the Court's attention 
on numerous occasions through various pleadings as well as during 
the oral argument itself. Defendants' assertion that the trustee's 
breach is being raised for the first time on appeal is simply 
without support. 
C. The Statute of Limitations Does Not Bar Plaintiff's Claim. 
Pursuant to § 327 of the Restatement (Second) of Trusts 
(1976) , a beneficiary may bring suit even when the Trustee is time-
barred: 
(2) If the third person knowingly 
participated in a breach of trust, the 
beneficiary is not precluded from maintaining 
an action against him therefor, unless: 
(a) The beneficary is himself guilty of 
laches, or; 
(b) A co-trustee who did not particpate in 
the breach of trust, or a successor 
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trustee knowing of the claim against the 
third person, fails to bring an action 
against him until he is barred by the 
Statute of limitations or by laches. 
Restatement (Second) of Trusts, § 327 at 126. 
Anna Lee is not required to plead that the Trustee knowingly 
breached his fiduciary duty in order to come within the exception 
provided in § 327 of the Restatement. She need only allege that 
the Defendants knowingly participated in a breach of fiduciary 
duty. Anna Lee pled with specificity Defendants1 knowledge of the 
terms of the Trust and their knowing violation of said terms. 
Defendants had the sophistication and expertise to interpret the 
Trust Agreement. In spite of their understanding of its terms, 
they induced the Trustee to sign a letter transferring assets from 
the Trust account to other accounts, in direct contravention of the 
Trust provisions. 
Pursuant to § 327 of the Restatement, even though the Trustee 
may be time-barred from bringing suit against Defendants, Anna Lee, 
as beneficiary of the Trust, may bring the suit as long as she is 
not guilty of laches. Anna Lee brought this suit immediately upon 
her discovery of the breach. Furthermore, there was no co-trustee 
at the time of the breach (other than Defendants as defacto 
trustees), and the successor trustee had not even been appointed 
until after Anna Lee discovered the breach and filed the instant 
action. 
Thus, pursuant to § 327 of the Restatement (Second) of 
Trusts, (1976), Anna Lee's claim is not time-barred. fl[W]here the 
trustee transfers trust property in breach of Trust to a third 
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person who has actual knowledge of the breach of Trust, it is clear 
that the beneficiaries will not be barred by the lapse of time 
merely because the trustee is barred." IV A. Scott, The Law of 
Trusts, § 327.2 at 326 (4th Ed. 1989). The comment to § 327(2) of 
the Restatement similarly provides that the beneficiary will be 
barred from bringing an action against a third party "if, but only 
if, he is himself guilty of laches. Thus, the beneficiary will not 
be barred if he is under an incapacity or ordinarily if he did not 
know of the breach of trust." Id. at 127-28. 
In the present case, Anna Lee is not guilty of laches. Anna 
Leefs complaint is not barred by the statute of limitations. 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
Anna Lee did not lose her standing to appeal when she filed 
her Amended Complaint. The trial Court entered a final order on 
her original Complaint on September 16, 1991 and that order is 
clearly appealable. Even if this Court were to find that Anna Lee 
lost her standing as a party when she amended her Complaint, under 
Utah law a person privy to the action and aggrieved thereby may 
appeal as well. Anna Lee is undoubtedly a privy to the action and 
aggrieved thereby and as such is entitled to bring this appeal. 
The trial court erred in dismissing Anna Lee's original 
Complaint. A beneficiary may bring suit against a third party who 
knowingly participates in a breach of trust, even when the trustee 
himself is time-barred, so long as the beneficiary is not guilty of 
laches. Anna Lee is the only proper party to bring this action. 
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Because of the trustee's involvement in the breach, albeit 
unknowing, he should not be expected to bring suit. Anna Lee has 
a compelling interest in the outcome of this case. No other person 
shares a similar interest in this action, and these issues will not 
be resolved if Anna Lee is denied the right to appeal. Anna Lee 
brought this suit immediately upon discovering the breach. Anna 
Lee is therefore not guilty of laches or barred by the statute of 
limitations. 
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